所別: 經濟學系 碩士班 不分組(一般生)

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科目: 個體經濟學

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\*請在答案卷(卡)內作答

1. (10 points) Consider two lotteries X and Y, with the density functions f(w) and g(w) as follows respectively, where w denotes the wealth level,

$$f(w) = \begin{cases} 2w, & \text{if } 0 \le w \le 1 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \text{ and } g(w) = \begin{cases} 5w^4, & \text{if } 0 \le w \le 1 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Note that for any two lotteries X and Y represented by the corresponding cumulative distribution functions F and G, X is said to first-order stochastically dominate Y if and only if  $\int u(w)dF \geq \int u(w)dG$ , where u(w) is any weakly increasing utility function. That is, the decision maker with a weakly increasing utility function u(w) would weakly prefer X to Y.

Given the above definition, it can be inferred that: \_\_ first-order stochastically dominates \_\_. Provide the proof for your answer.

2. (a) (7 points) Consider a two-good economy, and suppose that we observe a consumer's consumption bundles given the corresponding prices.

Consumption bundle  $x_1 = (4, 8)$  at price  $p_1 = (3, 2)$ .

Consumption bundle  $x_2 = (2, d)$  at price  $p_2 = (1, 1)$ .

Specify the condition for d so that it satisfies if and only if the weak axiom is *satisfied*.

(b) (9 points) Consider the set of bundles below from another consumer,

Consumption bundle  $x_1 = (6, 8)$  at price  $p_1 = (1, 1)$ .

Consumption bundle  $x_2 = (11,3)$  at price  $p_2 = (1,2)$ .

Consumption bundle  $x_3 = (7, d)$  at price  $p_3 = (4, 1)$ .

Specify the condition for d such that the weak axiom is violated.

注意:背面有試題

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
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3. (a) (4 points) Consider an agent with utility function given by  $u(x_1, x_2) = x_1^{1/2} x_2^{1/2}$ , and prices are given by  $p_1 = 12$ ,  $p_2 = 2$ . Draw, on the answer sheet, the income expansion path in the grid using the format suggested as the graph below.

(b) (8 points) Answer the above question when the utility is replaced by  $u(x_1, x_2) = x_1 + \ln(x_1 + 0.5x_2)$ .



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- 4. Fanny is planning to start a bakery. Her current wealth level is W. The bakery uses one input to produce one output, with the production function f(k) = k. The input costs 1 dollar per unit. The market price of the output is state-dependent. Specifically, there are two states  $\omega_1$  and  $\omega_2$ , where  $\omega_1$  realizes with probability q and  $\omega_2$  with probability 1-q. In the state  $\omega_1$ , the output price is  $p_1$ , while the output price is  $p_2$  in the state  $\omega_2$ . Assume that Fanny's (Bernoulli) utility function is u(x) = ln(x).
  - (a) (3 points) State Fanny's optimization problem.
  - (b) (9 points) Suppose that  $p_1 > 1$  and  $p_2 < 1$ . First, find the optimal amount of k, namely,  $k^*$ , and then specify the conditions such that  $k^*$  is positive. Finally, briefly discuss the underlying intuition of the conditions.
  - 5. Every year there are a lot of hit and run car accident cases. Consider a car accident, there are a criminal and a victim. The criminal can decide to escape (a.k.a. hit and run) or not to escape. If he escapes, he will be arrested with probability p and will be fined X dollars for punishment. Denote the initial wealth as W, the medical expense as E which can only be avoided if the criminal escapes without being arrested. (25 points)
    - (a) (5 points) Write down the condition which the criminal will **NOT** escape.
    - (b) (5 points) From the condition you found in (a), show that there is a level of X that can deter hit and run.
    - (c) (5 points) How this level vary with risk attitude of the criminal?
    - (d) (5 points) Another way of reducing escape rate is to increase p. Is this also vary with risk attitude of the criminal?
    - (e) (5 points) Compare these two methods, which is a more effective way to reduce hit and run?



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6. There are usually multiple plans you can choose from a telephone company. The plans that they provide usually come with a fixed part and a variable part. Consider the following two telephone plans. (25 points)

Plan	Monthly Fee	Call Charges
A	70	1.2 / 3 minutes
В	95	1.5 / 5 minutes

- (a) (5 points) Represent the total expense of plan A as a function of per minute call. Do the same for plan B.
- (b) (5 points) Draw a diagram to illustrate your solution in part (a), and find the intersection point.
- (c) (5 points) Explain how a rational consumer will make the choice between these two plans.
- (d) (5 points) Is there any private information known only to the consumers? How the company can learns this information?
- (e) (5 points) Why the company not just offer a simple price per minute plan?

