

考試科目	哲學系	所別	哲思	考試時間	4月8日 上午 9:00 至 11:30
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哲學中文部份：

請解讀闡釋下列兩段文字：(每題各佔25分)

1. 有雷同君子問於違眾先生曰：世之論者，以爲言不盡意，由來尚矣。至乎通才達識，咸以爲然。若夫蔣公之論眸子，鍾、傅之言才性，莫不引此爲談證。而先生以爲不然，何哉？先生曰：夫天不言而四時行焉，聖人不言而鑑識形焉。形不待名，而方圓已著；色不俟稱，而黑白以彰。然則名之於物，無施者也。言之於理，無爲者也。而古今務於正名，聖賢不能去言，其何故也？誠以理得於心，非言不暢，物定於彼，非名不辨。言不暢意，則無以相接；名不辨物，則鑑識不顯。鑑識顯而名品殊，言稱接而情志暢。原其所以，本其所由，非物有自然之名，理有必定之稱也。欲辨其實，則殊其名。欲宣其志，則立其稱。名逐物而遷，言因理而變。此猶聲發響應，形存影附，不得相與爲二。苟其不二。則無不盡。吾故以爲盡矣。（登歐陽建，「言盡意論」，藝文類聚卷十九。）
2. 夫象者，出意者也。言者，明象者也。盡意莫若象，盡象莫若言。言生於象，故可尋言以觀象。象生於意，故可尋象以觀意。意以盡象，象以言著。故言者所以名象，得象而忘言。象者所以存意，得意而忘象。猶蹄者所以在兔，得兔而忘蹄。筌者所以在魚，得魚而忘筌也。然則言者象之蹄也，象者意之筌也。是故存言者，非得象者也。存象者，非得意者也。象生於意而存象焉，則所存者，乃非其象也。言生於象而存言焉，則所存者，乃非其言也。然則忘象者，乃得意者也。忘言者，乃得象者也。得意在忘象，得象在忘言。故立象以盡意，而象可忘也。重畫以盡情，而畫可忘也。是故觸類可以爲其象，合義可以爲其徵。義苟在健，何必馬乎？類苟在順，何必牛乎？爻苟合順，何必坤乃爲牛？義苟應健，何必乾乃爲馬？而或者定馬於乾，案文責卦，有馬無乾。則僞說滋漫，難可紀矣。互體不足，遂及卦變。變又不足，推至五行。一失其原，巧愈彌甚。縱復或值，而義無所取。蓋存象忘意之由也。忘象以求其意，義斯見矣。（王弼，周易略例，「明象」）

備 考 試題隨卷繳交

命題委員：

(校料) 91 年 4 月 5 日

考試科目	哲學專業英文	所別	政治	考試時間	4月8日上午 星期六(下) 午第一節
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英語英文部分：

請對下列二篇英文作中文摘要：(每題各佔25分)

國立政治大學圖書館

3. **Central state materialism.** This brand of materialism was defended in the late 1960s and the early 1970s by David Armstrong. On this view all mental states are contingently identical with states of the brain or central nervous system that are apt to produce a certain range of behavior. Unlike logical behaviorism, central state materialism holds that mental states are actual internal states with causal effects. But, unlike Cartesian interactionism, it holds that psychophysical interaction is just physical causal interaction. Moreover, unlike logical behaviorism, central state materialism does not imply that mental sentences can be translated into physical sentences.

Some central state materialists held in addition that the mind is the brain. However, not every change in the brain is a change in the mind; but if the mind were the brain, that would be so. Moreover, the mind ceases to exist when brain death occurs, while the brain continues to exist. The moral that most materialists nowadays draw from such considerations is that the mind is not any physical substance, since it is not a substance of *any* sort. To have a mind is not to possess a special substance, but rather to have certain capacities – to think, feel, etc. (Compare the thesis that to be alive is to possess not a certain entity, an entelechy or *élan vital*, but rather certain capacities.) To that extent, Ryle was right. However, central state materialists insist that the properly functioning brain is the material seat of mental capacities, that the exercise of mental capacities consists of brain processes, and that there are internal mental states that are brain states that produce behavior. There is psychophysical causal interaction, although it is physical causal interaction.

Epistemological objections have been raised to central state materialism. We possess self-consciousness: we can know about our mental states. As self-conscious beings, we have a kind of privileged access to our own mental states, or at least to mental states that are not unconscious. The exact avenue of privileged access, whether it is introspection or not, is controversial. But it has seemed to many philosophers that our access to our own mental states is privileged in being open only to us. It is sometimes claimed, moreover, that the avenue

of privileged access yields incorrigible knowledge; e.g., one cannot be mistaken about whether one is in pain. This is, however, implausible for mental states such as emotions. One can be mistaken about whether one is angry. However, the privileged access view does not entail that we have incorrigible knowledge of all, or even of any, of our mental states. We lack any privileged avenue of access to the states of our central nervous systems. We come to know about central nervous system states in the same way we come to know about the central nervous system states of others. (The only exception proves the rule. We might know that a certain mental state is correlated with a certain central nervous system state and on the basis of that knowledge, together with the privileged first-person knowledge that we are in a mental state of the sort in question, come to know that we are in a central nervous system state of the type in question.) So, it is claimed, against central state materialism, that mental states cannot be states of our central nervous systems: for we have privileged access to the former but not to the latter.

In response, central state materialists can maintain that while types of mental states are types of neurological states, it will be only a posteriori true that a certain type of mental state is a certain type of neurological state. Suppose that pain is a neural state *N*. It will be only a posteriori true that pain is *N*. Via the avenue of privileged access, one comes to believe that one is in a pain state, but not that one is in an *N*-state. One can believe one is in a pain state without believing that one is in an *N*-state because the concept of pain is different from the concept of *N*. Nevertheless, pain is *N*. (Compare the fact that while water is H_2O , the concept of water is different from the concept of H_2O . Thus, while water is H_2O , one can believe there is water in the glass without believing that there is H_2O in the glass.) The avenue of privileged access presents *N* conceptualized as pain, but never as neurological state *N*. The avenue of privileged access involves the exercise of our mental, but not that of our neurophysiological, concepts. However, our mental concepts answer to the same properties (state types) as do certain of our neurophysiological concepts.

備 考 試題隨卷繳交

命題委員：

(簽章) 91年4月5日

考試科目	所別	考試時間	4月20日 上午第一節 星期六 (下)
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國立政治大學圖書館

4. punishment, a distinctive form of legal sanction, distinguished first by its painful or unpleasant nature (to the offender), and second by the ground on which the sanction is imposed, which must be because the offender offended against the norms of a society. None of these three attributes is a strictly necessary condition for proper use of the word 'punishment'. There may be unpleasant consequences visited by nature upon an offender such that he might be said to have been "punished enough"; the consequences in a given case may not be unpleasant to a particular offender, as in the punishment of a masochist with his favorite form of self-abuse; and punishment may be imposed for reasons other than offense against society's norms, as is the case with punishment inflicted in order to deter others from like acts.

The "definitional stop" argument in discussions of punishment seeks to tie punishment analytically to retributivism. Retributivism is the theory that punishment is justified by the moral desert of the offender; on this view, a person who culpably does a wrongful action deserves punishment, and this desert is a sufficient as well as a necessary condition of just punishment. Punishment of the deserving, on this view, is an intrinsic good that does not need to be justified by any other good consequences such punishment may achieve, such as the prevention of crime. Retributivism is not to be confused with the view that punishment satisfies the feelings of vengeful citizens nor with the view that punishment preempts such citizens from taking the law into their own hands by vigilante action - these latter views being utilitarian. Retributivism is also not the view (sometimes called "weak" or "negative" retributivism) that *only* the deserving are to be punished, for desert on such a view typically operates only as a limiting and not as a justifying condition of punishment. The thesis known as the "definitional stop" says that punishment must be retributive in its justification if it is to be punishment at all. Bad treatment inflicted in order to prevent future crime is not

punishment but deserves another name, usually 'telishment'.

The dominant justification of non-retributive punishment (or telishment) is deterrence. The good in whose name the bad of punishing is justified, on this view, is prevention of future criminal acts. If punishment is inflicted to prevent the offender from committing future criminal acts, it is styled "specific" or "special" deterrence; if punishment is inflicted to prevent others from committing future criminal acts, it is styled "general" deterrence. In either case, punishment of an action is justified by the future effect of that punishment in deterring future actors from committing crimes. There is some vagueness in the notion of deterrence because of the different mechanisms by which potential criminals are influenced not to be criminals by the example of punishment: such punishment may achieve its effects through fear or by more benignly educating those would-be criminals out of their criminal desires.

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