國立臺北大學九十七學年度碩士班招生考試試題

系(所)別:經濟學系
組別:
科目:個體經濟學
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I. (10 points) Multiple Choice Questions

- 1. Use the following two statements to answer this question:
 - I. Increasing returns to scale cause economies of scale.
 - Economies of scale cause increasing returns to scale.
 - (A) Both I and II are true. (B) I is true and II is false. (C) I is false and II is true. (D) Both I and II are false.
- 2. When people pay a monthly fee to have a hookup to the local telephone company's line plus a fee for each call actually made, we should say that the telephone company is using
 - (A) limit pricing. (B) a two-part tariff. (C) second-degree price discrimination. (D) bundling.
 - (E) intertemporal price discrimination.
- 3. Consider a perfectly competitive market for a good whose price elasticity of demand is -1.5 and price elasticity of supply is 0.5. The fraction of a specific tax that is borne by producers is:
 - (A) 0. (B) 0.25. (C) 0.5. (D) 0.75. (E) 1.
- 4. The problem of adverse selection in health insurance leads to a situation in which
 - (A) people choose inappropriate or inadequate coverage because they do not understand the complex information in the insurance policies.
 - (B) people choose too much coverage because they do not understand the complex information in the insurance policies.
 - (C) the percentage of the premium-paying population that is healthy rises, squeezing unhealthy individuals out of the market.
- (D) the percentage of the premium-paying population that is unhealthy rises, squeezing healthy individuals out of the market.
- 5. Let a firm's production function be $Q = \min \{L, K\}$, where Q is the level of output, L is the labor input, and K is the capital input. Let the wage rate be w = 1 and the rental rate of capital be r = 1. Which of the following is true?
 - (A) The total cost function of the firm is TC(Q, r, w) = wrQ.
 - (B) The total cost function of the firm is TC(Q, r, w) = (w + r)Q.
 - (C) The minimum efficient scale is zero.
 - (D) Both (A) and (C).
 - (E) Both (B) and (C).

II. (40 points) Fill in the following blanks.

1.Let a firm's production function be $Q = L^{1/3}K^{2/3}$, where Q is the level of output, L is the labor input, and K is the capital input. Let the wage rate be w and the rental rate of capital be r. Find the firm's long-run input demand function for labor.

2. Sam's utility function of income is $U(I) = 20\sqrt{I}$. Sam owns and operates a farm. He is concerned that a typhoon may wipe out his crops. If there is no typhoon, Sam's income is \$360,000. If a typhoon does occur, his income will fall to \$160,000. The probability of a typhoon is 1/20. Calculate the risk premium Sam is willing to pay for typhoon insurance.

- 3. Suppose a monopolist faces an inverse demand curve given by P = 120 3Q. The monopolist has two plants. The first has a marginal cost curve given by $MC_1 = 10 + 20Q_1$ and the second plant's marginal cost curve is given by $MC_2 = 60 + 5Q_2$. Find the monopolist's profit-maximizing total output level. ____(3)____
- 4. Suppose that a firm's production function is Q = 5L, where L is the quantity of labor and Q is the output level. Suppose that 接背面

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the firm can sell all its output at a market price of \$10. The firm is a monopsonist in the labor market and it faces a labor supply curve w = 2 + 2L, where w is the wage rate. Find the monopsonist's profit-maximizing wage. ____(4)____

- 5. Consider the efficient provision of a public good. Suppose that there are only two consumers in the market. The first consumer's inverse demand for the public good is given by $P_1 = 100 Q$ and the second consumer's inverse demand for the public good is given by $P_2 = 200 Q$.
 - (a) Suppose the marginal cost of the public good is \$240. What is the efficient level of production of the public good?
 - (b) Suppose the marginal cost of the public good is \$50. What is the efficient level of production of the public good?
- 6. Consider a two-player noncooperative game. In this game, player 1 first decides between "out" (O) and "in" (I). If he chooses O, the game ends with a payoff vector (2, 2). If he chooses I, then player 2 is faced with the same two choices. If player 2 chooses O, then the game ends with a payoff vector (1, 3). If she chooses I, then player 1 has another choice to make, between A and B. If player 1 chooses A, then the game ends with a payoff vector (4, 2). If player 1 chooses B, then the game ends with a payoff vector (3, 4). Assume that each player observes all the preceding play before making his or her choice.
 - (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. ____(7)____
 - (b) Find all the pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. (8)
- III. (18 points) 某產品的生產函數為Q= $\frac{1}{2}L^{\frac{1}{2}}+\frac{1}{2}K^{\frac{1}{2}}$,式中L為勞動,K為資本,其價格分別為W和r,求
- 1. L與K的邊際替代率。
- 2. L與K的替代彈性σ。
- 3. 擴張線方程式。
- 4. 長期成本函數。
- $5. 規模經濟指標S = \frac{AC}{MC}$ 。
- 6. 請判斷此生產技術的規模報酬特性。
- IV. (10 points) 假设中油為汽油業的價格領導者,中油的成本函數為TC=15q,其他廠商會依中油钉價決定自己的產量, 而其他廠商的供給總和為S: P=3q,且全國汽油業的市場需求函數為 P=100-q,請問
- 1. 中油的最適訂價、產量與利潤為何?
- 2. 汽油市場的均衡產量是多少?
- 3. 請繪圖說明上述問題與解答。
- V. (22 points) 假设消费者對 X 典 Y 的效用函数為 $U(X,Y)=X+\sqrt{Y}$,X 典 Y 的價格為 P_x 典 P_y ,消费者的预算為 M,
- 1. 求消費者對X財和Y財的普通需求函數。
- 2. 求間接效用函數及支出函數。
- 3. 請繪出Y財的所得消費曲線。
- 4. 请繪出Y財的恩格爾曲線。
- 5. 求Y财的Hicks補償需求函數。
- 6. 若所得M為 $100元,<math>P_x$ 為 $1元,當 P_y$ 由1元漲至2元時,求<math>Y財的Slutsky補償需求函數。
- 7. 若所得N為100元,Px為1元,求Px由1元漲至2元時之補償變量、對等變量以及消費者剩餘的變動為何。