

考試科目	台灣歷史與文獻解讀	系所別	台灣史研究所	考試時間	2 月 2 日(四) 第三節
------	-----------	-----	--------	------	----------------

注意 請用正楷字體撰寫，無法辨識一律不予計分。

- 一、請說明日治時期米糖相剋問題的源起、內容、解決方法與後續影響。(25%)
- 二、臺灣自有文字記載以來，就歷經多場戰爭，並劇烈改變外在關係與內在發展。請說明清法戰爭對臺灣的內外影響。(25%)
- 三、李登輝在 1999 年 7 月發表「特殊的國與國關係」論以前，蔣經國在 1981 年 3 月發表「三民主義統一中國」論如下面史料。(25%)
 - (1)蔣經國提到「復興基地三民主義建設的經驗與成果」，請說明「經驗與成果」為何？
 - (2)請根據此史料論述「三民主義統一中國」論在中華民國的中國大陸政策上之定位。

本次大會的主題，在於肯定建國七十年代乃是三民主義勝利的年代，是重光大陸的年代。因之大會的各個研究議題，都是環繞以三民主義統一中國為中心，深望全體代表同志，發揮集體智慧，貫徹共同目標。

其實，今天把中國同胞分隔兩邊的，不是台灣海峽，而是三民主義仁政與共產主義暴政兩種截然不同的制度。在同樣的三十一年中，我們在這復興基地，實踐三民主義，發揚中華文化，力行民主憲政，繁榮國民經濟，因之，家家豐衣足食，人人安居樂業，樹立了一個和諧的、開放的、進步的社會模式，不但適合中國人的生活需要，符合中國人的文化精神，也給中國人開拓了希望的道路，為中國前途描繪出一個光明的遠景。

與隔海共黨大陸的黑暗相對比，證實了本黨革命宗旨與途徑的正確性，更肯定了以三民主義統一中國的必然性。

復興基地三民主義建設的經驗與成果，不但鼓舞了大陸同胞奮鬥的希望與勇氣，也給所有中國人有了選擇的啓示，那就是這些實證經驗，完全切合中國社會未來發展的需要，而共產主義絕不可能。因之，以三民主義來統一中國，是使中國成為和平、自由的現代化國家唯一可行的道路，我們必須奠定更深更厚的基礎，作好重光大陸的準備。

七十年代中華民國在復興基地整體建設的構想，經國在本黨十一屆四中全會的講話中，已經提出了具體的指標，現在正由各部門的從政主管同志分別擬定實施計畫，全力執行。概括的說，我們國家建設的方向：

- 強化國防力量，達成國軍現代化目標，確保基地安全，隨時為光復大陸行動待命。
- 貫徹民主憲政，厲行法治，確實做到人民有權，政府有能。
- 全力推動經濟發展，繼續在穩定中求成長，提高國民所得，實現均富理想。
- 加強社會福利，擴大地方基層建設，使全民生活過得更幸福、更和諧。
- 促進文教建設與科技發展，發揚民族精神，提振國民道德，激勵創造智能，適應時代要求。

但最重要的任務，是要把三民主義的思想重新在大陸播種，把三民主義建設的實證經驗推向大陸，使大陸同胞人心一齊回歸三民主義，讓三民主義在大陸放射光華，加速共產制度的全面瓦解，實現民國七十年代成為三民主義勝利的年代！

中國國民黨以三民主義領導思想，以三民主義支持行動，一貫是我們致力國民革命的最高準則。因之，我們不僅能接受時代的考驗，而且能引領時代，承擔時代的責任和使命。

在當前的時代要求下，全黨同志的觀念和意志、黨的組織和黨的工作方法，都必須從大處著想，往遠處著眼，不斷求新求進，方能順應時勢，進而創造時勢。否則不進則退，退步即是失敗。因為唯有一個合乎時代的政黨，才能領導時代，開創時代。我們的理想，而是中國整個國家的道路；不只是為了今天復興基地民衆的需要，而是為了全體中國同胞未來的福祉；不只是謀求中國一國的自由和平，而是在求全世界的永久和平！

考 試 科 目	台灣歷史與文獻解讀	系 所 別	台灣史研究所	考 試 時 間	2 月 2 日(四) 第三節
---------	-----------	-------	--------	---------	----------------

- 四、以下史料是美國資深外交幕僚湯姆森(James C. Thomson)所提出之美國對台灣政策的修改建議(25%)
- (1)下線①「The High Costs of Ambiguity」：請引據此史料說明為何演變成「The High Costs」？
- (2)湯姆森於史料中描述當時的〈美國－中華民國關係〉，請論述其產生原因。

**Made changes to some parts of the text.*

**Memorandum From James C. Thomson [湯姆森], Jr., of the National Security Council [國
安會] Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (McGeorge
Bundy)**

April 15, 1965.

SUBJECT
The Taiwan Situation

① *The High Costs of Ambiguity**

I came away from Taiwan* deeply disturbed by the debilitating effects on both Chinese and Americans of a non-credible but unquestioned myth*: the myth of return to the mainland.

On the face of it, the situation is rather eerie*: the GRC* knows that we don't believe it; and we know that they know we don't believe it; and we suspect that some of them don't believe it; but no one says it. The result is that our every relationship is affected by the unmentionable dead cat on the floor.

I am most concerned by two costs that are paid out for continued ambiguity: the emotional and intellectual cost, and a more tangible* cost in the allocation of economic resources.

In the first category, the general effect of any over-riding myth is to make most serious discussion impossible. In the case of Taiwan, the ambiguity is a breeding ground for continuing suspicion of the U.S. and for latent anti-Americanism. As long as we make a pretense, by silence, of sharing their myth, we are subject continually to the charge that we are not true believers—and, by extension, that we are going to betray their interests. In permitting the ambiguity to linger, we hand to the GRC a considerable instrument of leverage* against us: leverage to force us regularly to prove what cannot be proven, i.e., that our hearts are in the right place on this issue. To assuage our guilt and sustain the ambiguity, we have to keep offering up bits and pieces of concessions. Finally, I might add, ambiguity permits some U.S. officials to begin to believe in the myth.

The second category of cost relates to the first. As long as the GRC is tacitly encouraged to honor the myth, its economic planning will be geared to implementing that myth through the maintenance of a foolishly massive defense establishment. One of the tragedies of Taiwan is the fact that the resources do indeed exist to make it a "garden spot", a "beacon of free Chinese development", and a "showcase" for

考 試 科 目	台灣歷史與文獻解讀	系 所 別	台灣史研究所	考 試 時 間	2 月 2 日(四) 第三節
---------	-----------	-------	--------	---------	----------------

the mainland and the rest of Asia. As one Chinese friend told me, "This place is obviously a paradise relative to the mainland; but the tragedy is that it could have been and could be so much more—a free, dynamic and prosperous alternative to the mainland."

Recommendations

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, I would conclude that the U.S. has a major interest in assuring that Taiwan's apparent stability and prosperity become real stability and prosperity. I would also conclude that we have certain instruments to achieve this result which we are not now using. Specifically, I suggest the following actions:

End the present U.S. ambiguity regarding mainland return in his dealing with top GRC officials. (Such a move should be coupled with absolutely firm assurances of our proper unambiguous commitment*: support for the continued free existence of Taiwan and the Pescadores*. We have many friends and allies with regard to whose grandiose aims we have agreed to disagree; it is high time to do the same with the GRC—it would be a far healthier arrangement, both for them and for us.)

* ambiguity: a word or expression that can be understood in two or more possible ways; the fact of something having more than one possible meaning and therefore possibly causing confusion

I came away from Taiwan: Thompson reported on a 2-week trip to Asian countries including Taiwan.

myth: an ancient story or set of stories, especially explaining the early history of a group of people or about natural events and facts

erie: strange in a frightening and mysterious way

GRC: the government of the Republic of China

tangible: real and not imaginary; able to be shown, touched, or experienced

leverage: the action or advantage of using a lever

commitment: the U.S.' official promise or firm decision to do something

Pescadores: the Peng-hu Islands

(以上)

備

註

- 一、作答於試題上者，不予計分。
- 二、試題請隨卷繳交。