

注意：考試開始鈴響前，不得翻閱試題，  
並不得書寫、畫記、作答。


國立清華大學 109 學年度碩士班考試入學試題

系所班組別：哲學研究所

科目代碼：4001

考試科目：英文

### —作答注意事項—

1. 請核對答案卷（卡）上之准考證號、科目名稱是否正確。
2. 作答中如有發現試題印刷不清，得舉手請監試人員處理，但不得要求解釋題意。
3. 考生限在答案卷上標記「由此開始作答」區內作答，且不可書寫姓名、准考證號或與作答無關之其他文字或符號。
4. 答案卷用盡不得要求加頁。
5. 答案卷可用任何書寫工具作答，惟為方便閱卷辨識，請儘量使用藍色或黑色書寫；答案卡限用 2B 鉛筆畫記；如畫記不清（含未依範例畫記）致光學閱讀機無法辨識答案者，其後果一律由考生自行負責。
6. 其他應考規則、違規處理及扣分方式，請自行詳閱准考證明上「國立清華大學試場規則及違規處理辦法」，無法因本試題封面作答注意事項中未列明而稱未知悉。

## 國立清華大學 109 學年度碩士班考試入學試題

系所班組別：0540

考試科目（代碼）：4001

共 2 頁，第 1 頁 \*請在【答案卷、卡】作答

本試卷共有四題翻譯題，每題 25 分，總分共 100 分。

請將以下各題的英文段落，翻譯為中文：

(一)

Doing comparative philosophy well can be very difficult because of the vast range of texts and their intellectual and historical contexts it requires its practitioners to cover. Oversimplifications, excessively stark contrasts, and illicit assimilations count as the most frequent sins. One benefit of comparative philosophy lies in the way that it forces reflection on the most deeply entrenched and otherwise unquestioned agendas and assumptions of one's own tradition. Another benefit at which its practitioners often aim is that the traditions actually interact and enrich one another. Demands for rigor and depth of scholarship obviously rank as some of the most important standards applying to philosophy inquiry. The task of meeting these standards becomes more manageable as the field of inquiry narrows. Such a result can be legitimate but sometimes myopic and impoverishing.

(二)

A kind person can be relied on to behave kindly when that is what the situation requires. Moreover, his reliably kind behaviour is not the outcome of a blind, non-rational habit or instinct, like the courageous behaviour---so called only by courtesy---of a lioness defending her cubs. Rather, that the situation requires a certain sort of behaviour is (one way of formulating) his reason for behaving in that way, on each of the relevant occasions. So it must be something of which, on each of the relevant occasions, he is aware. A kind person has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement that situations impose on behaviour. The deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge; and there are idioms according to which the sensitivity itself can appropriately be described as knowledge: a kind person knows what it is like to be confronted with a requirement of kindness. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity.

(三)

It has been contended in the last chapter that coherence is in the end our sole criterion of truth. We have now to face the question whether it also gives us the nature of truth. We should be clear at the beginning that these are different questions, and that one may reject coherence as the definition of truth while accepting it as the test. It is conceivable that one thing should be an accurate index of another and still be extremely different from it. There have been philosophers who held that pleasure was an accurate gauge of the amount of good in experience, but that to confuse good with pleasure was a gross blunder. There have been a great many philosophers who held that for every change in consciousness there was a change in the nervous system and that the two corresponded so closely that if we knew the laws connecting them we could infallibly predict one from the other; yet it takes all the hardihood of a behaviourist to say that the two are the same. Similarly it has been held that though coherence supplies an infallible measure of truth, it would be a very grave mistake to identify it with truth.

(四)

Understanding is always “of” something—objects, in a broad sense—but this of-ness is not the same as that of beliefs and desires. Thus, understanding is not the same as knowledge, a special kind of knowledge, or even a complex structure or totality of knowledge. Rather, understanding is a fundamentally distinct phenomenon, without which there could be no knowledge or mind at all. It needs, therefore, a different discussion—a discussion which, as it seems to me, has been missing in philosophy.

Understanding is the mark of the human. This is a better way to make the point, and for two reasons. On the one hand, understanding is *not* exclusively *mental* but is essentially corporeal and worldly as well; but, on the other, it *is* exclusively (and universally) *human*. Accordingly, intentionality, rationality, objective knowledge, and self-consciousness, properly understood, are likewise exclusively human. By ‘human’, I don’t mean specific to *homo sapiens*. Humanity is not a zoological classification, but a more recent social and historical phenomenon—one which happens, however, so far as we know, to be limited to *homo sapiens*.