

考試科目

哲學專業語文

所別

哲學系

考試時間

星期 月 日 上午 下午 第 節

流解闡述下列二段文章，每題各佔 25 分  
一、王弼《老子指略》

名也者，定彼者也；稱也者，從謂者也。名生乎彼，稱出乎我。故涉之乎無物而不由，則稱之曰道，求之乎無妙而不出，則謂之曰玄。妙出乎玄，衆由乎道。故「生之畜之」，不墜不塞，通物之性，道之謂也。「生而不有，爲而不恃，長而不宰」，有德而無主，玄之德也。「玄」，謂之深者也。「道」，稱之大者也。名號生乎形狀，稱謂出乎涉求。名號不虛生，稱謂不虛出。故名號則大失其旨，稱謂則未盡其極。是以謂玄則「玄之又玄」，稱道則「域中有四大」也。

二、《成唯識論》

今造此論，爲於一空有迷謬者生正解故。生解爲斷二重障故。由我、法執，二障具生，若證二空，彼障隨斷。斷障爲得二勝果故。由斷續生煩惱障，故證真解脫。由斷礙解所知障，故得大菩提。又爲開示謬執我法迷唯識者，令達二空，於唯識理如實知故。復有迷謬唯識理者，或執外境如識非無，或執內識如境非有，或執諸識用別體同，或執離心無別心所。爲遮此等種種異執，令於唯識深妙理中得如實解，故作斯論。

三、譯述下列二題，各佔 25%

**incommensurability**, in the philosophy of science, the property exhibited by two scientific theories provided that, even though they may not logically contradict one another, they have reference to no common body of data. Positivist and logical empiricist philosophers of science like Carnap had long sought an adequate account of a theory-neutral language to serve as the basis for testing competing theories. The predicates of this language were thought to refer to observables; the observation language described the observable world or (in the case of theoretical terms) could do so in principle. This view is alleged to suffer from two major defects. First, observation is infected with theory – what else could specify the meanings of observation terms except the relevant theory? Even to perceive is to interpret, to conceptualize, what is perceived. And what about observations made by instruments? Are

these not completely constrained by theory? Second, studies by Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and others argued that in periods of revolutionary change in science the adoption of a new theory includes acceptance of a completely new conceptual scheme that is incommensurable with the older, now rejected, theory. The two theories are incommensurable because their constituent terms cannot have reference to a theory-neutral set of observations; there is no overlap of observational meaning between the competitor theories; even the data to be explained are different. Thus, when Galileo overthrew the physics of Aristotle he replaced his conceptual scheme – his "paradigm" – with one that is not logically incompatible with Aristotle's, but is incommensurable with it because in a sense it is about a different world (or the world conceived entirely differently). Aristotle's account of the motion of bodies relied upon occult qualities like natural tendencies; Galileo's relied heavily upon controlled experimental situations in which variable factors could be mathematically calculated. Feyerabend's even more radical view is that unless scientists introduce new theories incommensurable with older ones, science cannot possibly progress, because falsehoods will never be uncovered. It is an important implication of these views about incommensurability that acceptance of theories has to do not only with observable evidence, but also with subjective factors, social pressures, and expectations of the scientific community. Such acceptance appears to threaten the very possibility of developing a coherent methodology for science.

備 考 試 題 隨 卷 繳 交

命 題 委 員 :

-31-

( 發 章 )

90 年 4 月 12 日

考試科目	哲學專業論文	所別	哲學	考試時間	星期	月	日	上午	下午	第	節
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國立政治大學圖書館

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(1) Most phenomenologists admit a radical difference between the "natural" and the "philosophical" attitude. This leads necessarily to an equally radical difference between philosophy and science. In characterizing this difference some phenomenologists, in agreement with Husserl, stress only epistemological issues, whereas others, in agreement with Heidegger, focus their attention exclusively on ontological topics.

(2) Notwithstanding this radical difference, there is a complicated set of relationships between philosophy and science. Within the context of these relationships philosophy has in some sense a foundational task with respect to the sciences, whereas science offers to philosophy at least a substantial part of its philosophical problematic.

(3) To achieve its task philosophy must perform a certain reduction, or *epoché*, a radical change of attitude by which the philosopher turns from things to their meanings, from the ontic to the ontological, from the realm of the objectified meaning as found in the sciences to the realm of meaning as immediately experienced in the "life-world." In other words, although it remains true that the various phenomenologists differ in characterizing the reduction, no one seriously doubts its necessity.

(4) All phenomenologists subscribe to the doctrine of intentionality, though most elaborate this doctrine in their own way. For Husserl intentionality is a characteristic of conscious phenomena or acts; in a deeper sense, it is the characteristic of a finite consciousness that originally finds itself without a world. For Heidegger and most existentialists it is the human reality itself that is intentional; as Being-in-the-world its essence consists in its *ek-sistence*, i.e., in its standing out toward the world.

(5) All phenomenologists agree on the fundamental idea that the basic concern of philosophy is to answer the question concerning the "meaning and Being" of beings. All agree in addition that in trying to materialize this goal the philosopher should be primarily interested not in the ultimate cause of all finite beings, but in how the Being of beings and the Being of the world are to be constituted. Finally, all agree that in answering the question concerning the meaning of Being a privileged position is to be attributed to subjectivity, i.e., to that being which questions the Being of beings. Phenomenologists differ, however, the moment they have to specify what is meant by subjectivity. As noted above, whereas Husserl conceives it as a worldless monad, Heidegger and most later phenomenologists conceive it as *being-*

*in-the-world*. Referring to Heidegger's reinterpretation of his phenomenology, Husserl writes:

one misinterprets my phenomenology backwards from a level which it was its very purpose to overcome. in other words, one has failed to understand the fundamental novelty of the phenomenological reduction and hence the progress from mundane subjectivity (i.e., man) to transcendental subjectivity; consequently one has remained stuck in an anthropology... which according to my doctrine has not yet reached the genuine philosophical level, and whose interpretation as philosophy means a lapse into "transcendental anthropology," that is, "psychologism."

(6) All phenomenologists defend a certain form of intuitionism and subscribe to what Husserl calls the "principle of all principles": "whatever presents itself in 'intuition' in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself." Here again, however, each phenomenologist interprets this principle in keeping with his general conception of phenomenology as a whole.

Thus, while phenomenologists do share certain insights, the development of the movement has nevertheless been such that it is not possible to give a simple definition of what phenomenology is. The fact remains that there are many phenomenologists and many phenomenologies. Therefore, one can only faithfully report what one has experienced of phenomenology by reading the phenomenologists. J.J.K.

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