

PART I

有兩題，總分 50 分，每題各 25 分

1. Read the passage and answer the questions in your own words (Chinese is fine) (25%)

The transformation at the heart of the *Zhuangzi*, then, is not necessarily or primarily a moral transformation. It is primarily a transformation in how one thinks and feels about the world, and in the behavior that expresses this. A key assumption is that even someone who loyally complies with all of the major recognized social norms, a "good" person, can have an inadequate and unsatisfying style of life, and should be motivated to transform herself or himself. There may be cases, of course, in which someone's inadequate and unsatisfying life includes what we would term immorality, and that enlightenment would have as one of its byproducts the elimination of the motivation for this immorality. This is not precluded by the *Zhuangzi*, but as far as I can see the work does not advertise increased moral virtue as one of the possible rewards of transformation.

Q1 What is the author's main point? (15%)

Q2 How do the lines of thought starting with "a key assumption" and "there may be cases, of course" contribute to the main point? (10%)

Kupperman, Joel (1996). "Spontaneity and Education of the Emotions." Kjellberg, Paul and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.). *Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi*. Albany: State University of New York Press. (p. 188)

2. Translate the following passage in fluent Chinese (25%)

The other way in which Chinese realism differs is that its underlying theory of language has no clear counterpart to the familiar conceptual structure of Western semantics. We find no concepts of *beliefs, concepts, ideas, thoughts, meanings, or truths*. Mohist thinkers create realist semantics out of the project of finding constant guiding discourse [...] Their analyses use the pragmatic term *ke* (admissible) as pivotally as Western analyses use *truth*. [...] The deep concern continues to be guidance, not description.

Hansen, Chad (1992). *A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. (p. 235)

PART II

請盡可能照字面上地 (literally) 翻譯以下段落 (40%)，並且簡要說明此段落的主旨為何 (10%)。總分 50 分

案：此處為現象學家 Dan Zahavi 批評兩位佛教學者 Dreyfus 和 Albahari 認為自我 (self) 不存在的主張。引文出自 Dan Zahavi, "The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications," in Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson and Dan Zahavi, eds., *Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, & Indian Traditions*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

"Let me divide my critical rejoinder into three parts.

1. First of all, I reject the univocal definition of self provided by Dreyfus and Albahari. Both are very confident in spelling out what a self is, and after having defined it, they then proceed to deny its existence. In my view, however, the definition they provide is overly simplistic. There is no doubt that some people have defended the notion of self that Albahari and Dreyfus operate with, but I would dispute the claim that their notion is the default notion, that is, that it is either a particularly classical notion of self or that it is a particularly commonsensical notion, that is, one that is part of our folk psychology. Consider again the claim that the self—if it exists—is some kind of ontologically independent invariant principle of identity that stands apart from, and above, the stream of

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changing experiences; something that remains unchanging from birth to death; something that remains entirely unaffected by language acquisition, social relationships, major life events, personal commitments, projects, and values, something that cannot develop or flourish nor be disturbed or shattered. Frankly, I don't see such a notion as being very much in line with our pre-philosophical, everyday understanding of who we are. As for the claim that the definition captures the (rather than a) traditional philosophical understanding of self, this is also something I would dispute. Just consider, to take some (not entirely) randomly chosen examples: the accounts we find in Aristotle or Montaigne (for informative historical overviews, cf. Sorabji 2006, Seigel 2005). In any case, when comparing the definition of self provided by Albahari and Dreyfus to the definitions found in contemporary discussions of self, it will immediately be evident that the latter discussions are far more complex, and far more equivocal, and that there are far more notions of self at play, including notions of ecological, experiential, dialogical, narrative, relational, embodied, and socially constructed selves. This complexity is ignored by Albahari and Dreyfus, and they thereby fail to realize that many of the contemporary notions of self—including those employed by most empirical researchers currently interested in the development, structure, function, and pathology of self—are quite different from the concept they criticize. To mention just one discipline that can exemplify this, consider developmental psychology and the work of developmental psychologists such as Stern (1985), Neisser (1988), Rochat (2001), Hobson (2002), or Reddy (2008). Thus, rather than saying that the self does not exist, I think self-skeptics should settle for a far more modest claim. They should qualify their statement and instead deny the existence of a special kind of self."

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