

考試科目	哲學專業論文	所別	哲學 141 146	考試時間	4月20日(日) 下午第二節
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壹、哲學史部份：

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國立政治大學圖書館

一、莊子於儒者之道，亦既屢謂之矣。而所謂者，執先聖之一言一行，以爲口中珠，而盜發之者也。夫羣言之興，多有與聖人之道相抵牾者。而泝其所自出，使在後世，猶爲狃狃榛榛之天下，則又何道之可言，何言之可破？唯有堯舜而後糠粃堯舜之言興，有仲尼而後糠粃仲尼之言出。入其室，操其戈，其所自詭爲卓絕者，皆承先聖之精餘以旁流耳。且夫天均之一也，周徧威而不出乎其宗，國運而皆能至。能體而備之者，聖人盡之矣。故或過言之，易言之，而所和于天倪者，則語不能顯，默不能藏，自周滅隱躍于其中，乃以盡天下之事物，人心之變變化化。志也，事也，行也，和也，陰陽也，名分也，時爲帝而無乎不在；六通四闢，小大精粗，宗皆不離，不必言天均，而自休乎天均矣。

(出自王夫之《六世莊子解·天下篇》)

一、【宋梅庵觀心說】夫謂人心之危者，人欲之萌也。道心之微者，天理之與也。心則一也，以正不正而異其名耳。惟精惟一，則居其正而審其差者也。細其異而反其同者也。能如是，則信執其中而無過不及之偏矣。非以道爲一心，人爲一心，而又有一心以精一之也。夫謂操而存者，非以彼操此而存之也。舍而亡者，非以彼舍此而亡之也。心而自操，則亡者存，舍而不操，則存者亡耳。然其操之也，亦曰不使旦晷之所爲，得以梏亡其仁義之良心云爾。非塊然兀坐以守其炯然不用之知覺，而謂之操存也。若盡心云者，則格物窮理，廓然貫通，而有以極夫心之所具之理也。存心云者，則敬以直內，義以方外，若前所謂精一操存之道也。故盡其心而可以知性知天，以其體之不蔽，而有以究夫理之自然也。存心而可以養性事天，以其體之不失，而有以順夫理之自然也。……若參前倚衡之云者，則爲忠信篤敬而發也。蓋曰忠信篤敬，不忘乎心，則無所適而不見其在是云爾。……大抵聖人之學，本心以窮理而順理以應物。如身使臂，如臂使指，其道夷而通，其居廣而安，其理實而行自然。

(出自《宋元學案·晦翁學案》)

備考	試題隨卷繳交
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考試科目	哲學專業英文	所別	哲學 141 146	考試時間	4月20日(上) 星期日 下午第二節
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一、哲學英文部份

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三、

Hegel's view of freedom is that only a substance can be fully free, and that a rational social world is a substance. Moreover, individuals can attain the fullest freedom available to them, as opposed to the misguided autonomy of Kant's ethics, only by becoming self-reflecting and endorsing accidents (as Hegel says) of a rational social world. The term "accidents" brings out that for Hegel, individuals cannot by themselves be substances, cannot be free on their own. Rather, they are accidents, as it were, of a substance—of a rational social world—and it is through *that* substance that they achieve their real freedom. Do not be antagonized by Hegel's use of the substance-accident terminology, although it is not entirely without fault and may encourage misinterpretation. It is crucial to stress that it is only through the self-reflection of individuals, and only in their being reconciled to their (rational) social world and in their correctly seeing it as rational and living their lives accordingly, that the social world itself is brought to its full substantiality. So while rational social institutions are the necessary background for freedom and for individuals' real autonomy, the reflection, judgment, and rational (reasonable) conduct of individuals are necessary to bring about the substantiality and freedom of their social world.

Thus for Hegel, in contrast to Kant, the aim of the account of ethics . . . . . is not to tell us what we *ought* to do—we know that—but to *reconcile* us to our *real* social world and to convince us not to fix our thinking and reflection on an ideal social world. For when we contemplate an ideal social world, we are likely to dwell on our real social world's shortcomings and then to criticize and condemn it. Whereas what we need to do is to become reconciled to the real social world by gaining insight into its true nature as *rational*; to gain this insight, we need a philosophical account of that world, and eventually a philosophical conception of the world as a whole, including a philosophy of history.

四、

Philosophical theories about rationality may be classified as either affirmative or negative. Affirmative theories endorse one or more culturally accepted roles for rationality, or propose some further role, while negative theories are sceptical about the validity of one or more such roles.

Thus the tripartite analysis of the soul that PLATO propounds in his *Republic* guarantees a dominant role for the faculty of reason both in the cognitive task of discovering the explanation of how things are and the justification of how they ought to be and also in the practical task of correctly managing a person's life. Reason, according to Plato, is like an eye of the soul and, after a due process of education and study, it can discern ultimate reality. Knowledge and virtue are therefore so bound up together in Plato's

conception of rationality that no-one who knows the right way to act can act wrongly. ARISTOTLE, however, insisted on the independence of cognitive and practical rationality, and thus allowed for the possibility of a person's doing what he knows to be wrong. Both Plato and Aristotle may be said to have held affirmative theories of rationality. But, while Aristotle's theory endorses culturally accepted norms in allowing room for an agent to feel remorse, Plato's theory attributes greater potential to the faculty of reason than ordinary norms of rationality assume.

But in modern philosophy the most influential sceptical challenge to everyday beliefs about rationality was originated by HUME. Hume argued the impossibility of reasoning from the past to the future or from knowledge

about some instances of a particular kind of situation to knowledge about all instances of that kind. There would be nothing contradictory, he claimed, in supposing both that the sun had always risen in the past and that it would not rise tomorrow. In effect therefore Hume assumed the only valid standards of cognitive rationality were those of the first three kinds listed above – viz. deductive, mathematical or semantical. Induction was not a rational procedure, on his view, because it could not be reduced to the exercise of reason in one or another of these three roles.

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