

壹、哲學中文部份 (50%)

請以白話文詳陳每段大意，並解讀闡述全文意義：

「……大學之法·禁於未發之謂豫·當其可之謂時·不陵節而施之謂孫·相觀而善之謂摩·此四者·教之所由興也·

發然後禁·則扞格而不勝·時過然後學·則勤苦而難成·雜施而不孫·則壞亂而不修·獨學而無友·則孤陋而寡聞·燕朋逆其師·燕闢廢其學·此六者·教之所由廢也·君子既知教之所由興·又知教之所由廢·然後可以爲人師也·故君子之教喻也·道而弗牽·強而弗抑·開而弗達·道而弗牽則和·強而弗抑則易·開而弗達則思·和易以思·可謂善喻矣·

學者有四失·教者必知之·人之學也·或失則多·或失則寡·或失則易·或失則止·此四者·心之莫同也·知其心·然後能救其失也·教也者·長善而救其失者也·

善歌者·使人繼其聲·善教者·使人繼其志·其言也約而達·微而臧·罕譬而喻·可謂繼志矣·

君子知至學之難易·而知其美惡·然後能博喻·能博喻·然後能爲師·能爲師·然後能爲長·能爲長·然後能爲君·故師也者·所以學爲君也·是故擇師不可不慎也·記曰·三王四代唯其師·此之謂乎·

凡學之道·嚴師爲難·師嚴然後道尊·道尊·然後民知敬學·是故君之所不臣於其臣者二·當其爲尸·則弗臣也·當其爲師·則弗臣也·大學之禮·雖詔於天子·無北面·所以尊師也·

善學者·師逸而功倍·又從而庸之·不善學者·師勤而功半·又從而怨之·善問者如攻堅木·先其易者·後其節目·及其久也·相說以解·不善問者反此·善待問者如撞鐘·叩之以小者則小鳴·叩之以大者則大鳴·待其從容·然後盡其聲·不善答問者反此·此皆進學之道也·

記問之學·不足以爲人師·必也其聽語乎·力不能問·然後語之·語之而不知·雖舍之可也·良冶之子·必學爲裘·良弓之子·必學爲箕·始駕馬者反之·車在馬前·君子察於此三者·可以有誌於學矣·

古之學者·比物丑類·鼓無當於五聲·五聲弗得不和·水無當於五色·五色弗得不章·學無當於五官·五官弗得不治·師無當於五服·五服弗得不親·

君子曰·大德不官·大道不器·大信不約·大時不齊·察於此四者·可以有誌於學矣·三王之祭川也·皆先河而後海·或源也·或委也·此之謂務本·」

(節錄自《禮記·學記》)

貳、哲學英文部份 (50%)

請以中文詳陳各術語意義：

「Section 7 of *Being and Time* is especially loaded with difficult terms, and to help you sort them out, I provide here an account of some of them.

### Phenomenon, Semblance, and Appearance

*Phenomenon*: this is, of course, the "master term" for the entire section. MH (Martin Heidegger) defines it as "that which shows itself, the manifest". Basically, a phenomenon is anything that we experience, anything that we encounter or "take in" in the course of going about our business in the world.

Although something we see might be the *first* example of a phenomenon we come up with, it will be important to MH that phenomena are not limited to objects of perception, or even cognition more broadly. MH will devote a lot of attention to the way we "take in" or "encounter" things in pre-cognitive experience. He likes examples such this: as you come into the classroom, you may gently push the door aside without even realizing you're doing that, without even noticing the door. Still, you "took the door in" in your practical navigation of the environment, as is evidenced by the way you dealt with it intelligently, even if unawares. The door will count as a phenomenon, for it "showed itself" to your practical activity, even if not to your subjective, mental experience.

*Semblance*: A semblance is what "shows itself *as* something which it is *not*". So for example, if Cindy comes to the party dressed as Carol, she *seems* to be Carol, but isn't. She dissembles. Semblance is illusion and distortion.

*Appearance*: Something appears, in MH's language, when it does not show itself, but rather "announces" itself by way of something else that does show itself. That is, as MH says, appearance involves a "reference-relation". X appears by way of Y, if Y shows itself and in so doing refers to or indicates X, which does not show itself. The best example MH gives is a symptom of a disease. The pock marks show themselves and in so doing indicate the occurrence of a disease. Similarly, the wind shows itself and is so doing indicates the occurrence of a change in barometric pressure.

Note that appearance is not semblance. First, the pock marks do not dissemble; they do not show themselves as the disease. Instead, the pock marks shows themselves as just what they are, pock marks. They refer to or indicate the disease. Second, the disease does not dissemble either; it does not show itself at all. Appearance is neither illusion nor distortion.

*Mere appearance*: MH further defines "mere appearance" as a special form of the appearance relation. If X does not show itself, but instead "emanates" or produces Y, which does show itself and which indicates the occurrence of X; and

symptoms of a disease bear an intelligible relation to the disease -- the disease explains the symptoms. The wind bears an intelligible relation to the change in barometric pressure -- again, the pressure explains the wind. But Kant's "appearances" bear no intelligible relation to the things in themselves that produce them. Thus, the things in themselves "merely appear" by way of what Kant calls "appearances."

### The Several Concepts of the Phenomenon

*The formal concept of the phenomenon:* MH uses this term to pick out the concept of the phenomenon, "when we leave indefinite which entities we consider as 'phenomena'". That is, the formal concept of the phenomenon abstracts away from or remains entirely neutral about which things are phenomena and which things aren't. So again, the formal concept of the phenomenon is a *generic* concept, covering all more specific concepts of types of phenomena. This becomes clearer by contrasting the formal concept of the phenomenon with:

*The ordinary concept of the phenomenon:* that which "is accessible through the empirical 'intuition' in, let's say, Kant's sense". That is, something is a phenomenon in the ordinary sense, if we experience it by means of the five senses. We may speak of "visual phenomena" or "auditory phenomena" in this sense.

*The phenomenological concept of the phenomenon:* MH argues that there is a distinctive sort of phenomenon, something that "is *necessarily* the theme whenever we exhibit something *explicitly*". Recall that last class I explained how in order to experience anything at all, we must have a "pre-understanding" of its being. Everything we encounter, we understand in terms of our implicit, practical mastery of its being. This means that being, as it were, pervades every phenomenon and makes it possible as a phenomenon. What I mean by saying that being "makes every phenomenon possible *as a phenomenon*" is simply that, e.g., a cat could not be manifest for us, if we did not have some kind of understanding of its being. The cat might be there (be "present-at-hand;" remember: we can't say "exist," since MH has reserved that for *Dasein*), but it could not show itself to us. Thus, being makes all phenomena possible as phenomena; it is necessarily pre-understood, whenever anything shows itself to us. It is, in MH's words, the "meaning and ground" of phenomena. ↓

(節錄自 Prof. W. Blattner: Terminology in Section 7 of *Being and Time*)

國立政治大學圖書館