

考試科目

哲學專業語文所別 哲學 1131 1136

考試時間

3月19日(正)  
星期六 下午第二節

一、請以中文，摘要敘述下面文章的重要概念和重點論證（可包含圖表）。（25分）

### 情愛的活動形態

有情的繫縛不自在，以情愛為他的特性。如能靜心的省察，不難深切的體味出來。有情的愛著，必然表現於時間中。一切存在，必現為時間相；時間有前後兩端，依前後兩端而安立現在。有情由於情愛的特性，所以對過去，總是戀戀不捨，隨時執著。此顧戀過去，不是一般的記憶，而是戀戀不捨，難以放下的。對未來，卻另是一樣，即時時向前追求，總覺得未來是怎樣的好；總是不滿於固有而要求新的，並且是無限的欲求。一面回戀過去的舊，一面又拚命追求未來的新，這二者是一大矛盾。不承受過去，不能創開未來；要開拓未來，又必然要超越過去。有情老是在這戀戀不捨的顧念，躍躍欲試的前進中。過去本有許多值得留戀的，但有情每故意忘卻，常懷念舊有的喜樂光榮，總覺得過去值得留戀。對於前途，雖不一定就是光明，光明也逃不了消逝的命運，但又覺得是好的，有希望的。這是有情的必然傾向，誰也不能否認。在此過未中間的現在，要離不離的染著，即緊緊的抱著不放。過去是幻滅了，未來還在夢中，現在就是這樣的警爾過去。愛染不捨，到底什麼是自己？什麼是自己所有？由於情愛戀著於無常流變的現實，顧此執彼，所以構成大矛盾。

情愛的活動，又必然是自我的活躍於環境中。有人說：人類的一切愛，都是以男女間的性愛為根本。愛兒女、父母、愛朋友等，不過是性愛的另一姿態。然以佛法說，這是不盡然的。有情是可以沒有性欲的，如欲界以上；即如一類下等動物，也僅依自體的分裂而繁殖。所以論到情愛的根本，應為「自體愛」。自體愛，是對於色心和合的有情自體，自覺或不自覺的愛著他，即深潛的生存意欲。自體愛又名我愛；這不獨人類如此，即最低級的有情也有。有了我，我是「主宰」，即自由支配者，所以我愛的活動，又必然愛著於境界，即我所愛。對於與自我關涉而從屬於自我的欲求貪著——我所愛，或稱之為「境界愛」。境界愛與自體愛，嚴密的說，有此必有彼，相對的分別為二（我與我所也如此），是相依共存的。有情存在於時間中，故發現為過現未的三世愛染，自體愛與境界愛，可說為有情的存在於空間中。愛著有情自體，而自體必有相對的環境，所以即以自我愛為中心而不斷向外擴展。如燈以住燄為中心，向外放射光明，使一切外物籠罩於光明中一樣。有情愛著自體，於是對關聯自體的環境也愛著。如在家庭中，即認為我的家庭而樂著；我的身體、我的衣物、我的事業、我的朋友、我的國家、我的名譽、我的意見等愛著，也是境界愛。有我即有所，這本為緣起依存的現實。由於情愛的愛著，想自主，想宰他，想使與自我有關的一切從屬於我。然而自我的自由，要在我所的無限擴大中實現；不知我所關涉的愈多，自我所受的牽制愈甚。想佔有外界以完成自我，結果反成為外界的奴隸。或者由於捕感我所的拘縛，想離棄我所而得自在。那知沒有我所，我即成為毫無內容的幻想，從何能得自由？從愛染出發，不能理解物我、自他、心境的緣起性，不能契合緣起事相，偏於自我或偏於外境，造成極端的神秘離世，與庸俗徇物。不過這二者中，自體愛是更強的。在某種情形下，可以放棄外在的一切，力求自我的存在。有故事說：一位商人入海去採寶，遇到風浪，船與寶都丟了，僅剩他一無所有的個人。別人替他可惜，他卻慶幸的說：「幸得大寶未失。」人還沒有淹死，這是自我愛的強烈表現。進一步，在某種情形下，只要生命不斷，甚至連手足耳目都可以犧牲。就是「殺身成仁」、「捨生取義」，也是覺得這是更於自我意義的。

平常以為愛著只是佔有的戀著，實則愛的意義極深，不但是如此的。經中常說有三愛：欲愛，有愛，無有愛。「欲」即五欲——色、聲、香、味、觸欲；對此五塵的貪愛和追求，是欲愛。貪著物質境界的美好，如飲食要求滋味，形式貪求美觀，乃至男女的性愛，也是欲愛之一，這是屬於境界愛的。「有」即存在，佛法以有情為本，所以每稱有情的存在為有。有愛，即於有情自體起愛，即自體愛。無有愛，即否定自我的愛。凡是緣起的存在，必有他相對的矛盾性，情愛也不能例外。對於貪愛的五欲，久之又生厭惡；對於自己身心的存在，有時覺得可愛而熱戀他，有時又覺得討厭。這如印度的一般外道，大都如此，覺得生活的苦惱，身心的難以調治，因此企圖擺脫而求出離。中國的老子，也有「吾有大患，為吾有身」的見解。這還是愛的變相，還是以愛為動力，這樣的出世觀，還是自縛而不能得徹底的解脫。這三愛，經中又曾說為三求：欲求，有求，梵行求。梵行求，即是修遠難行，以圖否定存在的愛求。

備

考

試題隨卷繳交

命題委員：

016

(簽章)

94年3月7日

考試科目	哲學專業語文	所別	哲學 1131, 1136	考試時間	3月19日① 星期六下午第2節
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二、請以中文，摘要敘述下面文章。(25分)

Yet Chuang-tzu himself does not wish to deny all reality to "things." "Saying is not blowing breath. Saying says something." (註 1) If our language was not clouded over by fixed judgments of right and wrong created by the false consciousness of our daily lives, if our language was not befuddled (註 2) by our fixed *parti pris* (註 3) or our tendency to absolutize relative distinctions among things, our words might give us a correct account of what is found in our unmediated experience of the world. Our language would respond to the way things present themselves without prejudice. Such an unclouded language would spontaneously respond appropriately to all the kaleidoscope shifts in the nature of the world and to the infinite variety of perspectives from which the world can be viewed. "If a man sleeps in the damp place his back aches, but is this true of the loach?" (註 4) It is quite accurate for the man to say that his back aches from the damp. This is saying "something" about man's relation to dampness. If he says that "dampness" is bad in any absolute sense, however, then his language does not "say something" or, rather, says too much. While "things" and situations may be "something," they are not self-sufficient entities which can be grasped in all their aspects from our own individual and transient perspectives. They are rather fluid somethings whose aspects and transformations depend on their relationship with a whole world of somethings, as in the case of the penumbra which upbraids the shadow. "You moved before. Now you stop. You were sitting. Now you stand. Why have you no fixed principle?" (註 5) The penumbra's behavior is totally dependent on the shadow's behavior. The shadow's behavior depends on the moving organism and the moving organism's on the *tao*. Language can say something about their movements. It cannot speak about them in terms of absolute "rights" and "wrongs" (in either the moral or intellectual sense of those terms). Thus, all particular beings and relations have their source of nonbeing.

註 1：《莊子·齊物論》：夫言非吹也，言者有言。

註 2：befuddle: to confuse (the mind, a person, etc.).

註 3：parti pris: preconceived opinion.

註 4：《莊子·齊物論》：民濕寢則腰疾偏死，歟然乎哉？

註 5：《莊子·齊物論》：罔兩問景曰：「曩子行，今子止；曩子坐，今子起。何其無特操與？」

備 考 試 題 隨 卷 繳 交

命 題 委 員：

017

(簽章) 94 年 3 月 7 日

考試科目	哲學專業語文	所別	哲學研究所	考試時間	3月19日(上)午第2節 星期六
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三. 請以中文說明以下論述的大意 (25分)

*Sense-certainty as immediate knowledge*

Hegel calls this natural awareness of things in the world *sense-certainty*. In sense-certainty, we are certain that we are sensing an individual object, independently of whatever other claims that we might later wish to make about it, and this sensing of the object supposedly gives us a knowledge of it. Sense-certainty thus makes a claim to being a form of knowledge that is independent of social practice or historical context; it is immediate knowledge in that it involves knowing something without having to know about anything else. It should remain steadfast throughout the other changes that we make in our epistemic setup. We may come to believe, for example, that we should abandon Ptolemaic astronomy in favor of more Newtonian views, and we might come to believe that Jehovah is the real deity and Vishnu only a figment of our own construction; but throughout all these kinds of changes of our epistemic claims, we should never find that we have to alter any of our claims about what we are immediately aware of in sense-certainty.

Sense-certainty involves the following: I, an individual *sensor*, am sensorily aware of an individual object.<sup>4</sup> But what exactly are we certain of in sense-certainty? We are certain of the *object* that we sense in that we may be said to be *directly acquainted* with the individual object itself. But how should we describe this object?<sup>5</sup> What can we say with certainty about this individual item except that it *is* and that we are directly acquainted with it? To say anything about what the object is, would involve us in ascribing various predicates to it, which we could not in turn assert with the same certainty. (We might say that it is round, only to find that it is really oblong, or that it is black, only to find that it is really blue.) It would seem, then, that the object of sense-certainty can only be a purely singular object, the kind of thing to which we can only refer with demonstratives such as "this," "here," and "now." The truth about sense-certainty, so it seems, is that it "contains nothing but the *being* of the thing [*Sache*]."<sup>6</sup>

It is all too easy at this point to misinterpret what Hegel is doing here by anachronistically reading into the argument certain twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophical themes about so-called non-inferential knowledge of sense-data. It would be only too easy to jump to the idea that the *object* of sense-certainty must be something like a sense-datum, an awareness of a specific mental object having certain sensuous qualities. While this understanding of sense-certainty might be compatible with many of Hegel's points, that is not the argument he is making there. The introduction of the idea of sense-data (as the authentic *objects* of sensuous consciousness) is the result of a theory of what the objects *must* be if there were to be the kind of immediate awareness that sense-certainty claims to provide. If we believe that there is indeed something of which we are immediately aware, then we might *postulate* sense-data (as a set of mental objects) as being the proper objects of sense-certainty in order to account for the possibility of such awareness. In the beginning of the *Phenomenology*, however, we are supposed to be describing natural consciousness as it immediately takes itself, and not yet postulating entities to explain it. At this point, we are only entitled to say: We are immediately aware of a singular object, this awareness seems to be both non-inferential and complete, and this consciousness is just its direct acquaintance with this singular object and nothing more. There is no expressible difference between our consciousness and the object of which we are conscious. Thus, it seems that what we have here is a relation between two items: an individual item (*eine Sache*) and an individual I.<sup>7</sup> It remains completely open as to *what* this individual object of awareness might be and what this "I" might be. Perhaps only a sense-datum would fill the role of "object" adequately; perhaps something else would fit the role better. Hegel takes the important point to be whether there even is such a role to be filled.

國立政治大學圖書館

備考	試題隨卷繳交
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命題委員： 018 (簽章) 94年2月18日

考試科目	1218 專業英文	所別	1218 研究所	考試時間	3月19日 星期六	上午第 2 節
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④ Explain and evaluate the following argument in English. (25 points)

It is impossible that contrary and dissonant things can harmonize in one order always or usually except by someone's governance, by which each and all are made to tend to a certain end. But in the world we see things of diverse natures harmonize in one order, not rarely and by chance, but always or for the most part. Therefore it is necessary that there be someone by whose providence the world is governed, and him we call God.

國立政治大學圖書館

備 考 試 題 隨 卷 繳 交

命題委員：

019

(簽章) 94年2月18日